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An Unnecessary Consternation:
An Analysis of the
Future of EU Arbitration in the
Wake of the West Tankers Decision
Mark G. Matema*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Fear cannot be banished, but it can be calm and without panic;
it can be mitigated by reason and evaluation."
- Vannevar Bush, renowned U.S. engineer
In the wake of the recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in
Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc. that appeared to limit the powers of
Member States of the European Union (Member States) in support of
arbitration, there has been a strong trend toward the dramatic. Indeed, the
West Tankers decision has been called the final nail in the coffin of anti-suit
injunctions in Europe and has even been viewed as a cornerstone to a
"perverse situation" where the ECJ will promote a broken system. Such
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2006; J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law,
and M.D.R. candidate at Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2011. Special thanks to Mr. John
Thompson, who first introduced me to the interesting dynamic of International Relations. Special
thanks also to Dr. Maxi Scherer for her insight in relation to this article. Thank you to the journal
staff for their dedication and hard work in preparing articles for publication.
1. ELAINE M. FORBES, M.A. & CYNTHIA J. MANSON, INNOVATE, COLLABORATE OR DIE:
How To CREATE AN ALLIANCE OR MERGER FOR A STRONGER, MORE EFFECTIVE NON-PROFIT 80
(2007).
2. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., 3 W.L.R. 696 (2009).
3. See Posting of Gilles Cuniberti to CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET BLOG,
http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/ecj-judgment-in-west-tankers (Feb. 10, 2009).
4. Samantha Tite & Emily Barlass, Another Nail in the Coffin ofAnti-Suit Injunctions in
Europe (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.vinsonelkins.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/WP-IDR-
2009_3_13.pdf; Spencer Wolff, Tanking Arbitration or Breaking the System to Fix It? A Sink Or
Swim Approach to Unifying European Judicial Systems: The ECJ in Gasser, Turner, and West
Tankers, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 65, 69 (2009), http://www.cjel.net/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/wolff.pdf.
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arguments assume Member States now have virtually no power to enforce
anti-suit injunctions or restrain litigation commenced in another Member
State.
Such assumptions are unfounded and, as a result, the strategies that have
been proposed to bypass a world without anti-suit injunctions are premature.
This article proposes that, despite the West Tankers decision, parties are still
not free to breach the terms of an arbitration agreement. On the contrary,
there has been a strong trend by English courts to find ways of preventing
parties from breaching such agreements.
The implications of this analysis are of utmost importance. With no
more than a rudimentary understanding of the effects of West Tankers,
parties may be caught up in the panic of a world without anti-suit
injunctions. As a corollary, they may lose faith in Member State courts and
could be unwilling to enter into arbitration agreements in these countries, or
seek other methods of economic stability altogether. With the economy in
such a volatile state throughout the European Union (EU) and much of the
world, such results may needlessly add to this instability.' In short, this
article serves to quell the panic and elucidate that the West Tankers decision
is not a nail in the coffin, but rather a mechanism to reiterate European
courts' dedication to ensuring that arbitration provisions remain a potent
force against economic infidelity.
Part II of this article will provide a brief background of anti-suit
injunctions and the West Tankers decision in the context of EU Arbitration.
Part III will outline reactions to this decision and pay particular attention to
commentary that illustrates trepidation regarding the future of arbitration
agreements in Europe. Part IV will reveal why these fears are overplayed by
analyzing two relevant English court decisions, their implications on both
micro and macro levels, and why the present system of EU arbitration will
remain unchanged. Though such measures are likely premature, Part V
discusses some proposals aimed at bypassing a system where anti-suit
injunctions are nonexistent. Part VI advocates a fresh perspective reframing
West Tankers as a catalyst to understanding the bright future of EU
arbitration. Finally, Part VII offers a conclusion reiterating the reality of this
supposed crisis.
5. See Posting of Barry Eichengreen & Kevin O'Rourke to VoxEU.ORG.,
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421 (Mar. 8, 2010). In reaching this conclusion,
Eichengreen and O'Rourke compare empirical evidence from the Great Depression (1929) to the
state of the present economy (2009). Id. Categories analyzed include: world industrial production,
world stock markets, volume of world trade, and industrial output in both small and large European
countries. Id. In every category, it is evident the economy is now worse off than it was during the
Great Depression. Id.
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II. THE WEST TANKERS DECISION
Anti-suit injunctions serve to prevent an opposing party from beginning
or continuing to commence a legal proceeding in another forum.6 The
purpose of such orders is to prevent forum shopping-the practice of
litigants who try to get their case heard in a court that will render the most
favorable decision.7  In the context of the EU, anti-suit injunctions are
governed by the Brussels Regime; these rules regulate the allocation of
jurisdiction in international legal disputes of a civil or commercial nature
involving residents of a Member State.s Specifically, the Brussels I
Regulation,9 a subsection of the Brussels Regime, was at issue in West
Tankers.
Prior to West Tankers, parties seeking to enforce arbitration provisions
could turn to English courts and were afforded two options if litigation was
commenced in another Member State.o First, the English courts had the
power to enforce the anti-suit injunction." Second, these courts had the
6. See Philippa Charles, Anti-Suit Injunctions: The ECJ Decision of 10 February 2009 in the
West Tankers Case (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/internationalarbitration/article.asp?id=7381&nid=235. See generally
THOMAS RAPHAEL, THE ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION (2008).
7. Assimakis Komninos, European Court of Justice Finds Anti-Suit Injunctions Unavailable
in Support ofArbitration Proceedings in Europe, INT'L DISPS. Q. (White & Case, New York, N.Y.),
Summer 2009, at 16, available at
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Uploads/Documents/IDQSummer_2009_v37.pdf.
8. See GREEN PAPER ON THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 2009, http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/Ideucom/148/14804.htm. The Brussels Regime consists
of three parts: the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation, and the Lugano Convention. Id.
% 2-6. The Brussels Convention was established in 1968 and "sought to avoid parallel legal
proceedings within the Community, to simplify the recognition and enforcement of judgments and to
strengthen the legal protection afforded to citizens of the Member States." Id. $ 2. The Brussels I
Regulation replaced the Brussels Convention in 2002 and "is designed to contribute to the continued
development of an area of freedom, security and justice and to the 'sound operation of the internal
market."' Id. $ 5. The Lugano Convention, established in 1988, extended the scope of the Brussels
Regime to "create common rules regarding jurisdiction and judgments across a single legal space
consisting of the Member States . .. and the three European Free Trade Association states of Iceland,
Norway, and Switzerland." Id. 6.
9. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 012) (EC).
10. Neville Byford & Afzalah Sarwar, Arbitration Clauses After West Tankers: The
Unanswerable Conundrum? Practical Solutions for Enforcing Arbitration Clauses, 12 INT'L. ARB.
L. REv. 29, 32 (2009), available at
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/IALRArbitrationClausesAfterWestTankersJune2009.pdf.
11. Id. at 32; see also David J. Howell & Sarah Catherine Thomas, European Court ofJustice
Decision on Anti-suit Injunction in West Tankers (April 2, 2009),
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authority to claim the costs of court proceedings brought in breach of an
arbitration agreement. 2 While the English courts' authority was challenged
in limiting the circumstances in which anti-suit relief was available, these
courts still had authority to grant an anti-suit injunction and restrain
litigation commenced in another Member State.13
Before analyzing reactions to West Tankers, it is first necessary to
understand the facts and rationale of this controversial case. The dispute
arose after a collision in Italy involving a vessel chartered by West Tankers
to Erg Petroli SpA (Erg).14  Pursuant to the charter party agreement, ErK
commenced arbitration proceedings against West Tankers in London.'
Subsequently, Erg's insurers (RAS) commenced court proceedings in Italy
to recover the insurance sum it had paid to Erg.'6 In response, West Tankers
turned to the English High Court for an anti-suit injunction, citing that
because the dispute arose out of the charter party it was subject to the
London arbitration provision." The High Court granted the anti-suit
injunction,'8 but while the House of Lords generally agreed on appeal, it
ultimately referred the case to the ECJ. 9
The crux of the case rested on whether it was consistent with the
Brussels I Regulation for a Member State court to restrain a party from
commencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State on the
ground that those proceedings were in breach of an arbitration provision.20
Examining the "arbitration exception" of the Brussels I Regulation, the ECJ
found that proceedings "which raise a preliminary or incidental issue
http://www.fiulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub id=3814&site-id=494&de
tail-yes.
12. Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
13. Id; see also Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 1.
14. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., 3 W.L.R. 696, 701 (2009).
I5. Id. at 701.
16. Id.
17. Id Thus, originally the English High Court found that the arbitration was applicable; in an
effort to protect West Tankers' right to have the dispute arbitrated, the Court found the proceedings
fell outside the scope of the Regulation. Id. See also Charles, supra note 6.
18. West Tankers, 3 W.L.R. at 701. Despite this injunction, RAS petitioned the English
Commercial Court to discharge the injunction. See id. at 713. This request was denied and a
permanent injunction was issued instead. Id. It was after this issuance that RAS appealed, and the
case was certified to the House of Lords. Id. See also Charles, supra note 6.
19. West Tankers, 3 W.L.R. at 701-02. Before referring the case to the ECJ, the House of
Lords made a number of astute observations. Perhaps most notably, it "recognized that the question
of whether or not to extend European authority to arbitration would affect the efficacy of arbitration
as a method of resolving commercial disputes." Charles, supra note 6. Additionally, Lord Hoffman
"underlined the importance of the principle of autonomy of the parties to choose the seat of
arbitration and governing law." Id.
20. West Tankers, 3 W.L.R. at 702. See also Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 1.
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concerning the applicability of an arbitration agreement" do not fall within
this exception.21  The ECJ reasoned that the subject of the foreign
proceedings was of paramount importance in determining whether or not the
matter fell within the Regulation. 22 Because the subject matter of the
proceedings in Italy was for damages, the ECJ found the Italian court had
jurisdiction to decide whether it could hear the issue.23 Consequently, it was
not within the English court's power to grant an anti-suit injunction to
preclude the Italian court from exercising its power.24 Such a result, the ECJ
concluded, would not only strip Member courts of the power to rule in their
own jurisdiction, but it would also run counter to the trust which Member
States accord to each other's court systems on which the Regulation is
based.
III. REACTIONS AND FEARS AFTER WEST TANKERS
Almost immediately after the ECJ rendered its opinion, there was strong
criticism of the West Tankers decision. While a few of the arguments may
hold some merit, they generally consist of overreactions that have needlessly
exacerbated current economic woes. By first understanding the reactions
and fears after West Tankers, an analysis of why these reactions are
unfounded becomes possible.
21. Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 1. Before any ECJ ruling is issued, it is first customary
that the ECJ Advocate General issue an advisory opinion. Charles, supra note 6. Though it is not
binding on the ECJ, it is usually very influential. Id. In his advisory opinion, Advocate General
Kokott essentially found the English court did not have the power to grant the anti-suit injunction
because it impinged on the autonomy of the courts of another Member State. Id. It was this
rationale that was the basis for the ECJ opinion as a whole. Id.
22. West Tankers, 3 W.L.R. at 706; see also Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 1-2.
23. West Tankers, 3 W.L.R. at 715. "[A] claim for damages, those proceedings come within
the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, a preliminary issue concerning the applicability of an
arbitration agreement, including in particular its validity, [which] also comes within its scope of
application." Id.
24. Id. at 711. In reaching this decision, the ECJ, like Advocate General Kokott, relied on the
ECJ's earlier decision in Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 3 W.L.R. 1193 (2005) (upholding the
Regulation in a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause even though the first set of proceedings
was brought by a party in bad faith). Id.
25. Id. at 704; see also Charles, supra note 6.
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A. London as a Venue for International Arbitration
London has long been an international hub for arbitration.26 Because
English law is a popular choice for business counterparties that do not
otherwise have a connection to England, these parties have been encouraged
to seek arbitration in London.27 Aside from its convenient location and
linguistic advantages, English law has become a cornerstone for arbitration
proceedings.2 8 A major reason for this phenomenon is the Arbitration Act of
1996,29 which consolidated case law from around the EU and set out
underlying principles that brought English law a step closer to being the
standard for international arbitration. 30 Finally, an English court's decision
in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Primalov indicated that English courts
were strongly supportive of international arbitration.31  When taken in the
aggregate, these factors illustrate that London has established itself as a
proverbial powerhouse, among other popular venues such as France and
Switzerland, in the world of international arbitration.
Given this reality, the West Tankers decision was of great concern both
to businesses in London and throughout Europe. The rationale behind this
fear was simple and was aptly described by Mr. Jamie Maples, an Associate
in the London Dispute Resolution Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP:
Currently, Europe is home to several major centers for international arbitration, such as
Stockholm, Paris, Vienna, and London, to name but a few. If the ECJ strips away the
jurisdiction of the national courts in these countries to protect arbitration agreements by
way of anti-suit injunctions, there is a significant risk that business people will choose to
arbitrate outside Europe instead, in arbitration centers like New York, Singapore, and
26. Interview by Al Driver with Matthew Shankland, Partner in the London Dispute
Resolution Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, & Jamie Maples, Associate in the London
Dispute Resolution Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (May 1, 2008), available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=September&artYear=200
9&EntryNo=8230.
27. Id.; see also Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 3; Charles, supra note 6.
28. See Interview with Matthew Shankland & Jamie Maples, supra note 26.
29. See generally BRUCE HARRIS, ROWAN PLANTEROSE & JONATHAN TECKS, DESCRIPTION
OF ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY (Blackwell Science Publishing 2007) (1996).
30. See Interview with Matthew Shankland & Jamie Maples, supra note 26.
31. Id.; see Fiona Trust Holding v. Primalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2008] I Lloyd's Rep. 254
(U.K.) (holding it is more difficult to argue to find an arbitration agreement invalid based on the
doctrine of severability; instead, a party would need to show evidence directly impeaching the
arbitration agreement, which is a much more difficult standard).
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Bermuda, where the relevant state courts are able to issue anti-suit injunctions of this
kind.32
Not only is the fear of losing business a concern, but London
businesspersons in the field of arbitration also feel this decision is a step in
the wrong direction, if not contrary to the decision in Fiona Trust.33  As
such, instead of London growing as a center for arbitration in Europe, the
West Tankers decision is feared to have the opposite effect, which may
ultimately result in drastic effects on the international arbitration market in
London and throughout many parts of Europe.
B. Torpedo Actions
In addition to the effects of West Tankers on London as an arbitration
venue, there is also the concern of "torpedo actions." A torpedo action is a
technique aimed at preventing proceedings from being heard in one Member
State by first commencing proceedings in another Member State where the
judicial system is notoriously inefficient or slow, such as Italy or Belgium. 34
The Brussels I Regulation states that if proceedings are brought within one
jurisdiction, they cannot be heard elsewhere at the same time.3 ' As such,
parties may delay an action for a prolonged period of time so that by the
time the first proceedings are heard in the less efficient Member State court,
there may be no point in pursuing the proceedings in another more efficient
Member State court system.
Even before West Tankers, parties regularly attempted to exploit the
Brussels I Regulation by trying to torpedo or paralyze lawsuits.37 In
32. See Interview with Matthew Shankland & Jamie Maples, supra note 26. Hong Kong may
also be a viable option in addition to the venues mentioned by Shankland and Maples. See Charles,
supra note 6.
33. See Interview with Matthew Shankland & Jamie Maples, supra note 26; see also Fiona
Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 254.
34. Patrick Boylan, West Tankers: End of the Anti-suit in Europe?(Sept. 29, 2008),
http://ld.practicallaw.com/8-383-4278#a511212. This also applies to Lugano countries; nations of
the Lugano Convention which include the old member states of the European Union and the
members of the European Free-Trade Association (EFTA). Id
35. See id,
36. Id.; see also Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 012) (EC).
37. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 68; see generally Pierre Vdron, ECJ Restores Torpedo Power,
35 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 638 (2004), available at
http://www.veron.com/publications/Publications/ECJRestores-TorpedoPower.pdf.
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response, the ECJ "rebutted any presumption that lengthy proceedings in the
courts of one of the Member States could ever give rise to a derogation from
Brussels J.",38 This doctrine of "mutual trust" essentially states that despite
inevitable delays, English courts must "trust" and decline jurisdiction over
torpedo actions, even if brought in bad faith.39 The purpose of this mutual
trust is to facilitate a harmonization of all European Courts. 40 Nevertheless,
critics believe that in practice this concept may instead be an incentive for
parties to bring bad faith claims. While case law has supported the mutual
trust doctrine, critics fear West Tankers is another detrimental step toward
legitimizing a policy that will cause a rise in bad faith torpedo actions.42
C. Other Concerns
Because critics feel West Tankers only aggrandized the problem of
torpedo actions, many fear this may force parties to engage in costly and
time-consuming litigation.43 Consequently, arbitrations may become more
expensive and may not be a viable alternative to litigation if costs become
comparable." With the rising costs of arbitration, cross-border commercial
contracts may be forced to increase as well.45 Ultimately, some critics feel
this case is a basis to lose faith in the ECJ as an efficient, well-reasoned
catalyst for justice.4 6 As Jonathan Harris, Professor of International
Commercial Law at the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom),
postulated:
It is difficult to conceive of a more thinly reasoned or incomplete judgment. It fails
sufficiently to examine the central question as to the meaning and scope of the arbitration
exclusion. In this respect, the question arises as to whether the validity of the arbitration
clause can be so easily dismissed as a preliminary issue in foreign liti ation that does not
alter the civil and commercial character of those foreign proceedings.
38. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 66.
39. Id.; see also Vdron, supra note 37, at 641.
40. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 68; see also Vdron, supra note 37, at 641.
41. See Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl., 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693; see also,
Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v. Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-
3565.
42. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 69.
43. See Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 69.
47. Id. at 68; Posting of Martin George to CONFLICt OF LAWS.NET BLOC,
http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/harris-on-west-tankers (Feb. 12, 2009).
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With such harsh criticisms, it is apparent that there is much concern over the
ECJ and the future of arbitration in general. At the same time, when
examined in the context of decisions since West Tankers, it becomes evident
that these fears are overplayed.
IV. WHY FEARS ARE OVERPLAYED
A. Empirical Evidence ofRecent English Court Decisions
As stipulated, there have been a number of fears after West Tankers, yet
these concerns are unsubstantiated. An analysis of the effects of West
Tankers requires a discussion of relevant English court decisions, empirical
evidence that is not based on mere conjecture. By examining two cases in
particular, it becomes evident that there is authority for other ways to avoid
the consequences of West Tankers. Both cases involve non-breaching
parties who brought arbitration proceedings following a ruling in a Member
State court. In both cases, the English court ruled it was not bound by the
decision of the foreign court. Perhaps most importantly, these cases provide
a basis that is instructive of problems encountered in practice, not claims that
are unsubstantiated.
1. Protecting the Non-Breaching Party: CMA v. Hyundai
In CMA v. Hyundai, the parties entered into four shipbuildin contracts
that stipulated arbitration proceedings would be held in London. When a
dispute arose, CMvA commenced proceedings in French court.4 9 Despite
settling the agreement outside of court, CMA continued with the
proceedings in French court and was awarded damages.50  In response,
Hyundai brought arbitration proceedings in London, claiming that CMA had
breached the arbitration agreement by continuing proceedings in French
court." The arbitrators held in favor of Hyundai, as did the English High
Court on appeal.52 The Court held it was not bound by the ruling of the
48. CMA CGM SA v. Hyundai MIPO Dockyard Co., [2008] EWHC (Comm) 2791, [2009] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 213 [213] (Eng.); Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
49. CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 213; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
50. CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 213; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
51. CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 213; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
52. CMA, I Lloyd's Rep. at 213-14; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
579
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French court.53 Instead, the Court examined what would have happened if
the contract had not been breached.54 Essentially, it relied on the tenet that
contract breakers should not be entitled to benefit from their own
wrongdoing. Pursuant to this rationale, the High Court found that, had the
contract not been breached, the matter would have been resolved by
arbitration and there would never have been a French judgment.56
In the context of West Tankers, CMA illustrates that a non-breaching
party may sue a breaching party to enforce an arbitration agreement even
though another Member State court has delivered an earlier judgment in the
breaching party's favor. 7  With this rationale in mind, the West Tankers
decision does not seem so daunting. After all, even if a non-breaching party
were in the precarious position of having an unfavorable judgment rendered
against it from another Member State court, it is likely that the arbitration
provision will be enforced-assuming it would have been enforced if the
contract had not been breached. As such, despite the fears that West
Tankers would facilitate a system where arbitration agreements could easily
be manipulated, the rationale presented in CAM illustrates the contrary-
arbitration agreements may be enforced irrespective of a decision by another
Member State court.
Perhaps the only deficiency in this rationale is that CMA was decided
prior to West Tankers. Nevertheless, there is no indication that this is no
longer good law.60 In fact, the English court's decision in National
Navigation v. Endesa6 1 supports this rationale.62
53. CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 213-14; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
54. CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 222-23; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
55. CMA, I Lloyd's Rep. at 222-23; Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32. This rationale
was first established in a much older case, though there is no indication it is outdated, nor has its
reasoning been overturned. See New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Socidtd des Ateliers et Chantiers
de France, [1919] A.C. I (H.L.) (U.K.).
56. CMA, I Lloyd's Rep. at 223 ("Had [the contract] not been breached, then the parties would
have both complied with their obligations to have the matter resolved by arbitration, and there would
be no French judgment. . . ."); Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
57. See Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
58. See id
59. See id
60. See id ("[T]he proposition that the English courts are not necessarily bound by earlier
decisions of other EU courts is supported by the more recent decision of the English High Court ...
61. Nat'l Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa 1), [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 666,
669 (Eng.), overruled by Nat'l Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa ll), [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 1397, 2009 WL 4667033 (Eng.).
62. See Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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2. The Public Policy Exception: National Navigation Co. v. Endesa
The controversy in National Navigation Co. v. Endesa involved a
supply contract where National Navigation (NNC) agreed to deliver coal to
Endesa via NNC's vessel.63 Subsequently, the vessel suffered damage, and
the goods were not delivered to Endesa in Spain.64 Though the charter party
included a London arbitration clause, Endesa commenced proceedings
against NNC in Spain.65 Shortly thereafter, NNC commenced proceedings
against Endesa in England and sought declaratory relief.66 In response, the
Spanish court found there was no arbitration agreement, and even if there
was, it was repudiated by the commencement of the proceedings in
England.67 Thus, at first, it appeared this case would be major blow to the
future of arbitration agreements.
Expanding on the rationale in CMA," the English court in Endesa found
"that they were not required to recognize the Spanish judgments in
proceedings in another Member State which were not themselves
proceedings within the Regulation because of the arbitration exception in
[Article] 1(2)(d)."69 In addition, the English court applied Article 34(1) of
the Brussels I Regulation-the public policy exception.70  This exception
states that a judgment will not be recognized if it is manifestly against public
policy.7' In Endesa, the English court found it would be manifestly against
English public policy to recognize the Spanish court's judgment regarding
the arbitration agreement.72 As a result, the English court found it necessary
to make an independent decision and ultimately held there was a valid
arbitration agreement that was not waived by NNC.73
The implications of this ruling are of paramount importance. Critics of
West Tankers concerned with the uncertainty of arbitration may take solace
63. Endesa I, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 669.
64. Id. at 669-70.
65. Id.
66. Id at 671; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32-33.
67. Endesa I, I Lloyd's Rep. at 676; see Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32-33.
68. In dicta, the court in CMA "left open the possibility that, due to the wording of the
Regulation, the Regulation did not apply to arbitration tribunals and that therefore they were not
bound to recognize court judgments." Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33.
69. Id.; see also Endesa I, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 690-91.
70. Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33; see also Endesa I, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 695-96.
71. Endesa I, I Lloyd's Rep. at 695-96; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33.
72. Endesa I, I Lloyd's Rep. at 695-96; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33.
73. Endesa I, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 695-96; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33.
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in the fact that Endesa evidences that English courts are very reluctant to
allow parties to breach the terms of an arbitration agreement.74 Despite the
ECJ's decision in West Tankers, English courts have found alternative ways
to preclude arbitration agreements from being arbitrarily breached.
3. Micro and Macro Level Implications
On a micro level, these cases bring a number of specific expositions to
light. In CMA, the English court applied the rationale that contract breakers
should not be entitled to benefit from their wrongdoing. In Endesa, the
court employed the public policy exception as a mechanism to find that an
arbitration agreement existed. Thus, the English courts have been able to
discover new avenues to ensure the future of arbitration.
On a macro level, this indicates a propensity toward facilitating
arbitration. While it remains to be seen whether this rationale will continue
to be used by English courts long-term, there is no indication it will not
remain a viable option through which English courts have some power to
enforce arbitration agreements. Thus, the panic that has grasped much of
Europe is exaggerated as there is no indication the future of arbitration is in
jeopardy. From these two English court cases, it appears arbitration will
remain an immutable tenet in European commercial agreements.
B. London Will Remain a Center for International Arbitration
Once the basis of relevant English court cases has been applied, it is
now appropriate to address the aforementioned concerns. A major fear has
been whether or not London will remain a major player in international
74. See Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 33.
75. Note that during the writing of this article, the decision in Endesa was overturned. Nat'l
Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa II), [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397, 2009 WL 4667033
(Eng.). In reaching its decision, the court evaluated the public policy argument, but found that there
was no public policy exception since Endesa was entitled to challenge the incorporation of the
arbitration clause. Id. 1 62. It is important to recognize that this decision does not mean the public
policy exception is not a viable tool for English courts as a whole; it was simply decided not to
pertain to this narrow set of circumstances: "The English court in such circumstances is not entitled
to examine for itself whether the clause is incorporated and that is the end of the matter." Id.
(emphasis added). As such, the public policy exception is still a viable weapon for English courts
and will likely be used in the future as a mechanism to help them enforce arbitration agreements.
76. See CMA CGM SA v. Hyundai MIPO Dockyard Co., [2008] EWHC (Comm) 2791,
[2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 223 (Eng.).
77. See Endesa I, I Lloyd's Rep. at 669-70.
78. See Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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arbitration in light of West Tankers.79 It is undisputed that the availability of
anti-suit injunctions has played a role in why London is such a popular
venue for international arbitration.80 However, stating that voidance of anti-
suit injunctions would have such a drastic negative effect on London's
importance as a center for international arbitration insinuates that anti-suit
injunctions are the only reason arbitration in London is so coveted. This
assumption is false. In reality, there are a number of other reasons London
has become such a popular hub for arbitration proceedings.
First and foremost, London is conveniently located and easily accessible
to parties both within the United Kingdom and throughout Europe.8 I As a
leader in international arbitration, especially since the institution of the
Arbitration Act of 1996, London is unique because it offers an availability
of experts accustomed to dealing with many types of commercial disputes.
Evidently, the West Tankers decision will have absolutely no effect on this
aspect, and there is no reason to believe London will not continue to grow as
a center of arbitration based on these offered conveniences.
In addition to location, London also remains a venue that has been
recognized as neutral in the scope of arbitration proceedings.s Moreover,
because English is recognized as the preferred language of business
throughout the European Union, London serves as a convenient place where
parties can engage at a neutral location in a language shared by the host
86nation.
Aside from location, neutrality, and language, London is also popular
because it conducts arbitrations pursuant to the Arbitration Act of 1996.
Prior to the institution of this Act, "the tendency of the English courts to
79. See Interview with Matthew Shankland & Jamie Maples, supra note 26.
80. See id
81. See id (proposing that London holds a geographic advantage).
82. See Heather Neilson, London as a Seat of Arbitration?, INT'L LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 27,
2009, http://www.imakenews.com/iln/e-article001393038.cfm?x=bl 1,0,w; see generally Arbitration
Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/actsl996/ukpga_19960023_en_1.
83. See Neilson, supra note 82.
84. See Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 3.
85. Id.
86. See generally Stephen Bickford-Smith, Barrister & FCIArb Chartered Arbitrator, Address
at Herbert Smith LLP (May 20, 2009) (highlighting the universality of the English language as a
means of business communication), available at
http://www.landmarkchambers.co.uk/datalassets/pdf file/0016/60910/SBSWhichSeat toChoo
se_- Arbitration Talk.pdf.
87. See Neilson, supra note 82; see generally Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.).
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intervene in arbitral proceedings meant that England was perceived as
insular and outdated." 8 The Act was enacted to make arbitration laws more
user-friendly and ultimately helped harmonize the laws of other countries
with English arbitration law as much as possible.89 This progress, coupled
with the fact that West Tankers does not affect the Arbitration Act of 1996,
will likely mean that London will continue to remain a popular destination
for those seeking arbitration in the EU.
Also of note when discussing London's importance in the world of
international arbitration is the availability of experts who act as arbitrators.90
Rather than practicing arbitration as a subsidiary to their primary practice,
these experts specialize in arbitrating a broad range of commercial disputes
that are often highly complex. 9' Moreover, instead of being averse to
arbitration, local courts are supportive of the process and results of
arbitration.92 For this reason, London is considered a specialized venue in
this context.93 To surmise that this strong reputation will simply diminish
due to West Tankers is incorrect.
When examining the claim that anti-suit injunctions are a key
determinant in deciding whether or not a party will seek arbitration in
London, it is helpful to examine venues that do not offer the luxury of anti-
suit injunctions. Popular destinations such as Stockholm, Geneva, Paris, and
Zurich are all preferred venues for international arbitration, yet anti-suit
injunctions are not available at any of these venues.94 Accordingly, it can be
inferred that the availability of anti-suit injunctions is not a determining
factor on its own as to whether a party will seek arbitration in a particular
88. Neilson, supra note 82.
89. See Neilson, supra note 82. The Act is also supportive of arbitration because it is contains
unique powers:
The 1996 Act is supportive of arbitration in the sense that the English court is empowered
to make orders in support of the arbitral jurisdiction of a tribunal including the granting
of injunctive relief, making orders for the preservation of evidence and compelling
witnesses to give evidence. Such supportive measures may be critical to the smooth
running of an arbitration, particularly where a recalcitrant party is involved.
Id. In addition, an arbitral award will be recognized with the same authority as if it was an order of
the court. This imparts a "finality" to the proceedings that are of paramount importance in the world
of business. Id.
90. Id.; see also Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 3.
91. See Neilson, supra note 82.
92. Id.; see also Boylan, supra note 34.
93. See Neilson, supra note 82.
94. See Boylan, supra note 34. While this list is far from exhaustive, it still illustrates just how
many popular international arbitration venues exist that do not offer anti-suit injunctions. Id.
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venue. Thus, like the aforementioned cities, London will likely remain a
popular seat for international arbitration.
C. Torpedo Actions Are ofAncillary Concern
As mentioned previously, torpedo actions are aimed at preventing
proceedings from being heard in one Member State by first commencing
proceedings in another Member State where the judicial system is
notoriously inefficient or slow. 95 By examining the rationale in CMA and
Endesa, it becomes evident that torpedo actions lose their luster as
formidable opponents to arbitration.
As a reminder, CMA held that a non-breaching party may sue a
breaching party to enforce an arbitration agreement even though another
Member State court has delivered an earlier judgment in the breaching
party's favor.96 This is rooted in the principle that contract breakers should
not be entitled to benefit from their wrongdoing.9 7 Applying this rationale to
torpedo actions, a non-breaching party can sue a breaching party to enforce
an arbitration agreement in the seat of arbitration, despite an outstanding
judgment rendered by a court of another jurisdiction.98 Thus, if a breaching
party's actions were found to have unjustly enriched the party, that party still
may be sued for breaching an arbitration agreement." As a result, torpedo
actions will not have the dramatic effect that many have fearfully
envisioned, and arbitration in the EU will essentially remain unchanged.
The rationale in Endesa illustrates a similar conclusion to that in CMA.
As discussed earlier, the importance of Endesa was that it established that in
the context of arbitration, a judgment will not be recognized if it is
manifestly against public policy. 00 This exception is relatively broad, and if
necessary, it is reasonable to believe that courts can use this rationale as a
95. See supra Part III.B.
96. See CMA CGM SA v. Hyundai MIPO Dockyard Co., [2008] EWHC (Comm) 2791,
[2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213 (Eng.); see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
97. See CMA, I Lloyd's Rep. at 213; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
98. See CMA, I Lloyd's Rep. at 213; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32.
99. See CMA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 213; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32. Though
it may seem a rudimentary point, it is important to note that this rationale will only apply to
arbitration agreements that are consented to by both parties. If no such agreement exists, torpedo
actions become a very real danger that can have serious consequences for the non-breaching party.
100. See Nat'l Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa 1), [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 666,
669 (Eng.), overruled by Nat'1 Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa 11), 12009] EWCA
(Civ) 1397, 2009 WL 4667033 (Eng.).; see also Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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catalyst to preclude parties from taking advantage of torpedo actions.
Consequently, this exception may serve to counterbalance torpedo actions,
rendering the panic discussed above moot. As a result, the other
aforementioned concerns, namely costly litigation and the lack of faith in the
ECJ, are also moot because the analysis illustrates a system where the future
of effective arbitration in the EU is bright.
D. Narrowness of the Decision Precludes Far-Reaching Effects
Finally, it is important to remember that the West Tankers decision was
narrow; though the ruling limited the English court's jurisdiction inside the
EU, English courts are still free to grant anti-suit injunctions in nations
outside of the EU and Lugano nations.'o' As a result, English courts may
restrain proceedings in nations such as Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland.10 2
In contrast, there is no indication that the decisions in CMA and Endesa
are as narrow as that in West Tankers. Through these decisions, English
courts set a precedent in international proceedings that they will protect the
non-breaching party and are intent on enforcing arbitration agreements in the
name of public policy. Because London is viewed as a leader in
international arbitration, this rationale will likely spread to neighboring
courts throughout the EU and possibly beyond. Therefore, it would be fair
to assume that EU courts will likely make it more difficult to breach
arbitration agreements and, thanks to CMA and Endesa, now have a general
framework to ensure this outcome.
E. The Present State of International Arbitration in the EU Will Remain
Intact
When examining the effects of West Tankers as a whole, the logical
question arises: what effect, if any, will this decision have on international
arbitration in the EU? Building on the conclusions of the previous analysis
coupled with an examination of the present major advantages and
disadvantages of international arbitration, it may be concluded that
international arbitration in the EU will be no better or worse as a result of
West Tankers.
101. Byford & Sarwar, supra note 10, at 29.
102. See Boylan, supra note 34.
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1. Advantages of International Arbitration Will Remain Unchanged
Despite recent developments that indicate international arbitration
proceedings have become much slower, they are generally faster than
litigation.'03 There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, the lack
of any procedural rules allows the parties a certain level of latitude to tailor
the procedure to fit their particular needs.'"4 Moreover, arbitral awards are
final and not subject to appeal, which means that arbitration, at least in
principle, resolves the dispute in a much more timely fashion than
litigation.'0o Lastly, arbitrators generally have more flexible schedules than
judges overseeing court proceedings. 0  Accordingly, arbitrations can be
scheduled on weekends and holidays if necessary, and the process can be
resolved more quickly.107 This flexibility can provide some important
advantages in terms of resources and convenience over the slower and
potentially far more treacherous realm of litigious proceedings.
In the context of West Tankers, this advantage will remain unchanged.
While it may be argued that West Tankers will result in time-consuming and
costly litigation for innocent parties that will be forced to litigate in a foreign
court after they had previously agreed to arbitrate, the previous analysis
103. See Peter Sherwin, Ana Vermal & Elizabeth Figueira, The Decision to Arbitrate, INT'L
ARB., http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/I (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). Even though
international arbitration is generally speedier than litigation, a number of factors are making
arbitration a slower process than it has been in the past. Id. For example, given that more parties are
choosing arbitration, the cases that are arbitrated are becoming increasingly complex and take longer
to reach a resolution. Id. Parties are also agreeing to more lengthy procedures given the nature of
their more complex disputes. Id. Additionally, if the arbitration has its seat in a country with
outdated international arbitration laws, a party may disrupt the arbitration by bringing courts into the
process. Id. See also Guide to International Arbitration in Europe, EUR. ARB. REV. (WilmerHale,
London, U.K.), 2007, at 3-4, available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/1ce4f65a-
f4b5-45b0-bcb5-78560c03fe30/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0e8a8937-f537-4d7a-8ca4-
ab5a40fb7fl7/Guide%20to%20International%20Arbitration%20in%20Europe%20-
%201ntroduction.pdf.
104. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103; see also James W. Morando & Nan E.
Joesten, Leverage Points in International Arbitration, IP LITIGATOR, May/June 2005, available at
http://www.fbm.com/index.cfn/fuseaction/publications.detail/object-ida053f2f3-5924-46f8-bcb8-
14ae4b4f0880/LeveragePointsinIntemationalArbitration.cfm.
105. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103; see also K&L Gates, Practices and
Industries: Arbitration-International and Domestic,
http://www.klgates.com/practices/ServiceDetail.aspx?service=61#benefits (listing toward the end of
the webpage "The Benefits of International Arbitration").
106. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
107. Id.
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illustrates such predictions are far-fetched. In reality, the speediness of
international arbitration proceedings will remain a formidable asset for those
seeking an alternative to litigation.
In addition to the advantage of its speed as a process, another important
benefit of international arbitration is that it is generally much less costly than
litigation."os This stems in large part from the fact that international arbitral
awards are not subject to appeal and are more easily enforced than a foreign
court judgment.'09 Despite a number of costs that are associated with
international disputes in general, namely expenses associated with
translation and travel costs, these facets are the same in litigation as they are
in arbitration."o As a result, such costs seldom play a role in the decision-
making process in helping parties decide whether to choose arbitration or
litigation in the international context."'
Much like the advantage of speediness, these cost-efficient advantages
associated with international arbitration will remain intact irrespective of the
West Tankers decision. As previously noted, English courts are setting a
precedent to protect non-breaching parties in the name of public policy that
could conceivably spread to other EU courts and beyond." This will ensure
that many courts, both inside and outside the EU, may soon make it much
more difficult to breach an arbitration agreement, which will result in
arbitration being as popular as it is presently. Consequently, the notion that
West Tankers will result in more costly litigation is a fiction; the favorable
costs of arbitration will likely remain a strong incentive for parties seeking
to resolve an international dispute.
108. See K&L Gates, supra note 105.
Although many commentators take the view that [ilnternational [a]rbitration is
progressively adopting procedures and approaches which more closely mirror state court
litigation, scope still exists to construct more cost-effective procedures, . . .
[d]ocumentary disclosure is rarely conducted, . . . depositions are rarely granted, the
tribunal commonly takes a more hands on approach to procedure, and techniques such as
witness conferencing and chess clock time divisions can dramatically reduce the duration,
and hence the cost, of the process.
Id. See also Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
109. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103; see also Morando & Joesten, supra note
104.
110. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
111. Id.
112. See Nat'l Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa 1), [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 666,
669 (Eng.), overruled by Nat'l Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA (Endesa Il), [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 1397, 2009 WL 4667033 (Eng.).
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Perhaps one of the most prevalent draws to international arbitration is
the option of a confidentiality agreement.'"3  Unlike court proceedings,
arbitral proceedings are private and not part of the public record. 14
Arbitration, therefore, is an attractive option to parties that would prefer to
resolve their disputes outside the scope of the public consciousness."'
Assuming parties specifically agree to arbitration beforehand, this
characteristic of arbitration can almost never be breached."' 6 Accordingly,
because it can be enforced even if parties commence proceedings in another
nation, West Tankers will have virtually no effect on confidentiality
agreements in the broader context of EU arbitration.
Another advantage of arbitration is that it gives parties the freedom to
select the place and language of the arbitration proceedings."' Arbitration
allows a great deal of latitude in this context so the parties can tailor the
process to fit their own respective needs."8 For example, if preferred,
parties may even agree to have the proceedings conducted in two
languages. Unlike litigation, the place of the proceeding does not
determine the language in which the arbitral proceeding will be
conducted.120  This advantage can be viewed as an extension of the
flexibility of international arbitration in general; a process where parties are
not bound by a strict set of evidentiary or procedural rules but are virtually
free to shape the procedure for their particular dispute.121 While it may be
argued that this flexibility may serve as an incentive to commence torpedo
actions after West Tankers, the previous analysis illustrates this is not a
113. Morando & Joesten, supra note 104; see also Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note
103.
114. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
115. Id.
116. Id. Note that in some rare circumstances, even if parties have agreed to confidentiality, an
award might be disclosed. These situations typically arise with public companies or "in the context
of enforcement proceedings." Id.
117. See Guide to International Arbitration, supra note 103; see also Sherwin, Vermal &
Figueira, supra note 103. "The decision cannot, however, always be dictated by convenience only:
the parties also need to take into account how arbitration-friendly the chosen location is in order to
avoid disruptive court intervention." Id.
118. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
119. Id. While this is true, it is more common that the parties will agree on one language and
expressly allow documents to be filed in two or more languages without translation. Id To avoid
language ambiguities, the arbitration clause provision should specifically mention, without
limitation, possible areas of contention. See also Morando & Joesten, supra note 104.
120. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
121. Id.
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cause of concern given the potentially broad implications of a public policy
exception. For those seeking a more structured process than arbitration to
resolve an international dispute, litigation is always available. The
availability of these two options on different ends of the flexibility spectrum
indicates that the present state of international arbitration will likely remain
unaffected.
A final advantage of international arbitration is the ease of enforcing
arbitral awards.122 Many times in international disputes, the prevailing party
may need to enforce the award in another nation where the losing party has
assets.123 In contrast to litigation, where there are no multilateral treaties
available between countries to enforce each other's court judgments,
international arbitration offers nations the option to ratify The New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention).124 Except for a number of limited exceptions, 25
the New York Convention requires signatory states to recognize arbitral
awards rendered in other countries.126
As it relates to West Tankers, the availability of the New York
Convention serves as a virtual security blanket. Because it has been ratified
by over 140 nations, it acts as a formidable opponent to economic infidelity
and will make parties think twice before attempting to shirk their
responsibilities as a losing party.127  Though seeking enforcement by the
New York Convention would be preemptive given the many reasons
stipulated earlier, its mere existence will ensure that the enforceability
advantages afforded by international arbitration will remain unchanged.
2. Disadvantages of International Arbitration Will Remain Unchanged
Like virtually every process, there are certain disadvantages with
international arbitration. Among the most glaring deficiencies is that in
international arbitration, discovery is usually limited and at times, even
122. See Guide to International Arbitration, supra note 103; see also Sherwin, Vermal &
Figueira, supra note 103.
123. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
124. Id. See also Convention on Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art. IV, §§ 1-2, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/ny-convention/text.htm [hereinafter New York Convention].
125. New York Convention, supra note 124, art. V, §§ 1-2.
126. New York Convention, supra note 124, art. III. See also Sherwin, Vernal & Figueira,
supra note 103.
127. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
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totally excluded from the process altogether.'28 Moreover, though it has
been discussed as a potential advantage of international arbitration, the
absence of appeals could instead turn out to be a disadvantage in certain
cases. 29 For example, while the absence of an appeal guarantees there will
be only one proceeding and precludes the losing party from commencing
expensive and time-consuming appellate procedures, it simultaneously
ensures no other tribunal may review a flawed award. 3 0 Thus, in some
circumstances international arbitration advocates a system that necessitates
court intervention while simultaneously precluding such measures.' 3'
Lastly, because arbitration is a consensual process, arbitrators do not have
the ability to consolidate actions or join third parties that were not
signatories to the arbitration agreement.132 This is in dramatic contrast with
litigation where a court has the power to consolidate actions and join third
parties without the parties' consent.'33
Notwithstanding the faulty presumption that West Tankers will
drastically affect EU arbitration, the aforementioned shortcomings will not
change. After all, anti-suit injunctions have no conceivable relation to
deficiencies in the discovery process. Likewise, a trend toward requiring
appeals in international arbitration as a means to preclude the "death of anti-
suit injunctions"l 34 is inconceivable; such a result would conflict with a
major reason many seek arbitration in the first place: to use a cost-effective
process where there is finality to the dispute.'35 Essentially, any advantages
128. Id. Indeed, this can be viewed as either an advantage or disadvantage depending on the
situation of the party in a dispute. For example, it can be an advantage to parties unfamiliar or
uncomfortable with the sometimes hostile process of discovery. Id.
129. Id.; see also Morando & Joesten, supra note 104.
130. See Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note 103.
The impossibility to appeal arbitral awards is thus an advantage only where the tribunal
has rendered a well-founded award. In order to minimize the risk of a flawed award, and
unless the amounts at stake in the arbitration are too low to justify a three member
tribunal, it is thus as a general matter recommended that the parties agree on three
arbitrators rather than one.
Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 1.
135. See Morando & Joesten, supra note 104; see also Sherwin, Vermal & Figueira, supra note
103.
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of requiring appeals would be outweighed by the negative effects such
measures would have on the finality and cost-effectiveness of international
arbitration. Lastly, since there is no discernible connection between the
West Tankers decision and the inability of arbitrators to consolidate actions
or join third parties, this limitation will likely continue in the world of
international arbitration.
In short, the present state of international arbitration will remain intact.
The myriad of advantages that international arbitration provides are unique,
namely its efficiency and flexibility, which has resulted in a steady rise in
popularity for parties seeking an alternative to litiqation."' This popularity
has steadily risen despite some shortcomings.' As a result of this
popularity, not only for parties, but also for courts who view this option as a
mechanism that eases arduous caseloads, it would take a dramatic step to
change the current state of international arbitration.s38 West Tankers fails in
this regard and will likely impact neither the advantages nor the
disadvantages espoused with international arbitration, at least not in the
foreseeable future. Instead, the present system will remain relatively
unchanged even in the face of the unnecessary consternation that has
developed.
V. BYPASSING IMPLICATIONS OF WEST TANKERS
The above analysis shows that the panic after West Tankers has been
overplayed and the future of EU arbitration is not in jeopardy. As such, a
discussion of methods aimed at bypassing possible negative implications of
West Tankers is premature. Nevertheless, in the interest of proposing a
broad proposal to quell the panic of West Tankers, a brief overview of useful
measures is appropriate. Should a party be in a situation where an anti-suit
injunction is unavailable and a party is attempting to commence a torpedo
action, there are generally three options available. 39
A. Apply for a Stay
First, the party should apply for a stay-that is, to seek a stay of the
foreign court proceedings under Article II of the New York Convention.140
136. See Guide to International Arbitration, supra note 103.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Boylan, supra note 34.
140. See id. The relevant part of the New York Convention states:
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As previously noted, this provision requires signatory states to recognize
arbitral awards rendered in other countries. 141 This tactic is practical in the
context of EU arbitration, and even outside the EU, because it has been
ratified by over 140 nations, including all of the Member States.142 Should
the application for stay be successful, the threat of parallel proceedings in
another state will be precluded, and the costs of the breach of the arbitration
agreement will be recoverable. 14 3
B. Commence Arbitration in London
If the application for stay fails, the party's alternative move should be to
commence arbitration in London.'" Arbitral tribunals, unlike English
courts, are under no obligation to stay their proceedings if a foreign court
has accepted jurisdiction over the parties' dispute.145 Consequently, a party
may commence arbitration in London that is parallel to the proceedings in a
foreign court.' 4 Because arbitration in London is likely to be much more
efficient and speedy than court proceedings in other countries, such as
Belgium and Italy, the arbitral award may be delivered long before the
foreign court has rendered its decision. 147 Essentially, the result is that the
torpedo action in the slower foreign court backfires against the party
attempting "to scupper the agreement., 1 4 8
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
New York Convention, supra note 124, art. II, § 3.
141. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
142. Status, 1958--Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
http://www.uncitral.orgluncitrallen/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.htmil.
143. Boylan, supra note 34.
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Id. Indeed, it may even be appropriate to commence parallel proceedings before this stage.
Id
147. Id. This of course is a generality as it is possible the foreign court proceeding may not
take as long as anticipated. Nevertheless, for the most part, certain nations' court proceedings are
notoriously slow and should be taken into account.
148. Id.
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C. Enforce the Agreement Under the NY Convention
After receiving an arbitral award in London, the party must overcome
the final hurdle of getting the award enforced. For the most part, this will
seldom present any obstacle because such an arbitral award will be
enforceable in many nations, including all of the Member States that have
adopted the New York Convention into their respective laws.149 Ultimately,
these steps represent realistic and effective methods to quash a party
attempting to commence a torpedo action. Given that English courts have
established a precedent to enforce arbitration agreements and not reward the
breaching party, the outlined steps aimed at bypassing torpedo actions will
likely be used sparingly. Nevertheless, the reality that there are such viable
avenues available further illustrates that the panic surrounding West Tankers
has been exaggerated.
VI. A FRESH PERSPECTIVE
Ever since the ECJ delivered its judgment in West Tankers, the decision
and the court have been vehemently criticized. Skepticism and criticism are
an integral aspect of improving any system, yet the attention surrounding
West Tankers has been aggrandized to the level of near panic."o From this
fiasco, a great level of uncertainty has grown regarding the future of EU
arbitration. Even after Endesa, which was decided after West Tankers, the
fear has not been mitigated. Harping on the shortcomings of West Tankers
precludes scholars and critics from concentrating on new methods to
improve the system, which may serve to stabilize a faltering world economy.
Rather than continue on this path of self-destruction, the time has come
for leaders in EU arbitration to take action and realize the reality of the
situation. While the fear that comes with a decision such as West Tankers
cannot be completely banished, an approach based on reason and evaluation
may quell some of the trepidation. There have already been some initial
steps taken with this approach in mind. Most notably, commentators from
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have proposed that legislative
change may be needed to cure the deficiencies of the law in this context.' 5 1
The Heidelberg Report advocates removal of the arbitration exemption from
the Brussels Regulation and substituting it with a catalyst between
149. See UNCITRAL, supra note 142; see also Boylan, supra note 34.
150. See Tite & Barlass, supra note 4, at 2.
151. See George, supra note 47; see generally BURKHARD HESS, THOMAS PFEIFFER & PETER
SCHLOSSER, THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 44/2001: APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU
(2008) (for example the Heidelberg Report has taken steps toward achieving this end).
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international arbitration and the courts.s 2 Though not free from criticism,
this proposal advocates a fresh perspective that looks forward and does not
dwell on the shortcomings of West Tankers.153  More forward-thinking
proposals like this will further ensure that the future of EU arbitration, which
has been virtually unaffected by West Tankers, will continue to flourish in
the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
There has been much trepidation regarding the West Tankers decision,
which appeared to limit the powers of Member States' courts in support of
arbitration. Specifically, there has been much concern over the future of
London as a viable center for international arbitration. In addition, the threat
of torpedo actions has caused much anxiety. As a corollary, many fear
arbitration will become more time-consuming, expensive, and may not
remain a realistic option to litigation.
The consternation that has developed is overplayed. An analysis of two
key cases, CAM and Endesa, illustrates that there has been a strong trend by
English courts to enforce arbitration agreements. In the future, courts can
turn to the rationales in these cases to establish a basis to enforce arbitration
agreements, namely that a breaching party cannot benefit from its own
wrongdoing and the public policy exception. Furthermore, by examining the
plethora of reasons London is popular as a venue for international
arbitration, it becomes evident that anti-suit injunctions are not a key
determinant in its popularity. Torpedo actions also lose their luster as
formidable opponents to arbitration when taking the rationales of CMA and
Endesa into account. As a result, there is no indication that arbitration will
become more expensive, time-consuming, or any less viable in the future.
Though premature, there are a number of ways to bypass the
implications of the West Tankers decision. Should a party be in the
precarious position where an anti-suit injunction is unavailable, a party may
152. See generally HESS, PFEIFFER & SCHLOSSER, supra note 151 (the Report proposed
removing the arbitration exemption from the Brussels Regulation and replacing it with an entirely
new interface between courts and international arbitration).
153. See Resolution on the Implementation and Review of Council Regulation (EC) No
44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, EUR. PARL. (Sept. 7, 2010) (advising strongly against adopting the tenets of the
Heidelberg Report). This illustrates that the Report will likely not serve as a viable framework in the
future.
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apply for a stay, commence arbitration proceedings in London, or enforce
the agreement under the New York Convention. At least one of these
practices will likely be successful in bypassing West Tankers.
The future of arbitration agreements, even in the wake of West Tankers,
is indeed bright. Given the state of the EU economy, and indeed the world
economy at large, it is time to have faith in the Member State courts to
provide a source of economic stability. By understanding the rationale of
West Tankers and its implications, the panic expressed by many parties in
the EU should be quelled. As a result, a fresh perspective aimed at forward-
thinking can help support some preliminary steps that have already been
proposed toward stabilizing the EU economy, and hopefully the world
economy as a whole. Though Vannevar Bush's statement was voiced in the
context of engineering, his sage advice is applicable to the trepidation
regarding West Tankers as well: while it may not be possible to completely
eliminate the fear created by this decision, it is possible to mitigate any panic
via reasoned analysis and evaluation that looks toward the future.
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